Friday, July 18, 2014

Is it hot In here, or is it just me? Reality as Contested Terrain

You’ve been there. Someone walks into a room and asks, “Is it hot in here, or is it just me?” Have you ever thought about that question? It seems rather odd to say such a thing when you look at it at face value. Don’t you know whether the room is too warm or not? Can’t you decide for yourself? Why ask the question? What this question—and others like it—betray is how fragile our grasp of reality is.


We feel compelled to engage in what is best understood as a “reality check.” We look to others to confirm our perceptions of reality and, by developing agreement, we decide what is real and what isn’t. “Yeah, I’m feeling kinda warm myself.” Between the two of you, you’ve determined that the room is too warm. But what happens when a third person enters the room and says, “Brrr! Is it cold in here or what?” Their reaction challenges your shared understanding, your sense of what is real. However, this third person is also at a disadvantage given that the two of you have already decided upon the question of temperature. “Actually, we’re kinda warm in here.” Now you have two different views of reality confronting one another. And without even speaking the words out loud, you’ve sent the message: “There must be something wrong with you. You must be getting sick.” While such words may never be spoken, the message is received and the third person begins to doubt her perceptions. “Oh really? Huh! I must be getting sick.” And with that, the challenge to the dominant reality determined by the first two people—the idea that the room is too warm—has been defeated and everyone can relax again, safe in the idea that their grasp of reality is secure.

Notice that this entire conversation occurred without even consulting a thermometer! Presumably, a thermometer would give us an objective measure of the temperature of the room—an objective sense of reality. But we don’t need objective measures to convince ourselves that what we perceive is real. All we need are others who agree with us. Then it is real! But what if those first two people were wrong? What if their senses were “off?” What if they were just crazy? What if the third person had the most accurate perception of temperature? From the perspective of the dominant group, it doesn’t matter. Their agreement has created a reality more “objective” in their eyes than any thermometer could provide. They now have the power of numbers and can impose their understanding of reality upon all others who would disagree. And the more people who join them, the more powerful their version of reality becomes.

In this way, society—our collective perceptions, understandings, and definitions—achieves the character of objective REALITY. And the most compelling evidence for this objective quality of society is its coercive power. Sociologist Peter Berger tells us, “The final test of [society’s] objective reality is its capacity to impose itself upon the reluctance of individuals” (1969:11). Once we have a shared and therefore objective sense of reality, it must be dealt with. Creating reality through interaction and agreement is a fateful endeavor. It’s not like blowing bubbles that float harmlessly away, dissolving as they do so. This might be the image that rugged individualists have: that individuals are the primary movers and shakers in this world and that individuals can accomplish anything on their own if they only set their minds to it and work hard enough. But our actions—individually and collectively—have consequences that limit our future choices and options.

Instead of blowing bubbles, we are building bricks every time we create a sense of agreement about anything in our world. And we know better than to toss those bricks up into the air, for they won’t float harmlessly away. Instead, we lay those bricks down, building the walls and structure of our society. And once those walls are in place, we must deal with them. We have to walk around them, or walk through the door we placed in the wall. We can climb over the wall, tunnel under the wall, or blow up the wall. Regardless, we have to confront the reality of The Wall. And so that wall—that thing we call society we created through simple interaction and agreement—shapes our lives, limiting our behavior and our perception of what is real. In fact, that wall is so much a part of our lives that we don’t even really recognize it for what it is: our own prison. In this way, the fundamental coerciveness of society is not in its ability to control or to punish, but in its power to impose itself as an unquestioned reality (Berger 1969:12). Society is at its strongest when we don’t even notice it; when we take it for granted.

However, as the vignette above indicated, there isn’t just one monolithic REALITY out there determining all of society. There are diverse populations and cultures within society, each with its own agreements—their own versions of reality. And there are plenty of situations in which those competing realities clash with one another in what might be understood as “reality contests.” Is climate change caused by humans real? Many, many people, including that vast majority of scientists, agree that it is. But there are others who, while smaller in number, seem to have a considerable amount of power and influence and who have determined that it is not real and are fighting for their own version of reality. A reality contest. One of countless others. Was Obama born in the U.S.? Was the world created in just six days? It is where these reality contests exist that reality—society itself—is most fragile. So many people are willing to ignore the thermometer, or even toss it out altogether.

These areas of contested terrain highlight how uncertain social reality can be. Which vision of reality will come out on top and dominate over the others? Can the thermometer really be ignored? And actually, isn’t the thermometer itself—our instrument for “objective” measurement—a socially constructed product dependent on collective agreement … one that varies between Fahrenheit, Celsius, and so on?

Is it hot in here or is it just me?

Berger, Peter L. 1969. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor Books.

Monday, January 20, 2014

The Stigmatized Organization: Setting a Research Agenda

The following represents a review of the limited work on the stigmatized organization and sets the stage for an examination of the clergy sex abuse scandal and the stigmatization faced by the Catholic Church. As a social psychologist, and unlike an organizational sociologist, I am curious to explore the processes by which an organization is stigmatized. Individual priests, bishops, cardinals, and even the previous pope have been stigmatized for the part they played in this scandal, but the larger institution of the Church has been stigmatized as well. Not surprisingly, the Church has blamed a few "bad apples" for the scandal—a move that is in keeping with the research in this area. However, the Church has also been widely criticized for shifting the blame in this way and refusing to examine its underlying structure—a response that the current literature fails to anticipate.


The research on stigma has more recently been criticized for its largely micro-level analysis of interactive processes without consideration of the larger, structural ramifications of stigmatization. Link and Phelan explicitly seek to go beyond a purely social psychological understanding of stigmatization and propose examining it from a “distinctly sociological perspective” (2001:364). They rightly point out that the narrow focus on specific stigmatized populations has resulted in a focus on the stigma or mark itself as opposed to the process through which others identify some as stigmatized (2001:366) as Goffman had originally intended. According to Goffman (1963), stigma is more about relationships and interactive processes than specific attributes. As described by Link and Phelan, this process involves imposing dominant cultural beliefs through labeling differences and distinguishing between “us” and “them.” Those who end up in the out group category (“them”) lose status vis a vis the in group category (“us”) and face discrimination (see also Allport 1954). Such stigmatization ‘is entirely contingent on access to social, economic, and political power” (2001:367)—what Branaman (1997), in her examination of Goffman’s body of work, might include under the term “structural resources.” In other words, it is those with such power or structural resources who are able to engaging in labeling, categorizing, and ultimately discriminating against those without control over the labels. In this way, Link and Phelan make clear the larger, structural relevance of stigmatization.

Hannem (2012) extends this structural approach to stigmatization by placing Goffman’s work in conversation with the work of Foucault. As described by Hannem, Foucault made an effort to understand current conditions by tracing them back to their origins, focusing on the unfolding discourse and policies. Such a genealogical approach allows one to engage in a structural analysis regarding “the ‘origin’ of stigma, generally, and a historical understanding of the specific contexts in which particular attributes were defined as discrediting” (2012:21). As a result of this focus, Hannem adds the concept of “structural stigma” to the work of Link and Phelan (2001) and their perspective on discrimination arising from the stigmatization process. Structural stigma “is the result of a carefully calculated decision at an institutional or bureaucratic level to manage the risk that a particular population is perceived to present, either to themselves, to the institution, or to society” (Hannem 2012:24-25). With structural stigma, there is no intent to harm or discriminate. In fact, the stated purpose may be to help. Ultimately, however, the power differential and resulting stratification noted by Link and Phelan (2001) are present.


Link and Phelan (2001) and Hannem (2012) have done much to both restore Goffman’s original focus on the relational and interactive dynamics involved in stigmatization and to push the research agenda in the direction of a more structural understanding of stigmatization, freeing the concept from a purely micro-sociological focus. At the same time, however, there is room for more work with regard to stigmatization, specifically with regard to the process through which organizations are stigmatized.

Despite the social psychological origins of the concept of stigmatization, much of the research on organizational stigma has occurred outside the field. Organizational image restoration has been the subject of research within the fields of communications and public relations (e.g. Hearit 2001 and Benoit 1995), focusing on the use of rhetoric to provide corrective accounts for the event that damaged the image of the organization. For example, Brinson and Benoit (1999) analyzed the image restoration techniques used by Texaco chair Peter Bijur after a taped executive meeting revealed racist language. Among the techniques used was mortification (issuing an apology), corrective action (by opening an investigation into the problem), and shifting the blame to a subset of Texaco employees who were characterized as “bad apples.” Such shifting the blame opened the door for an additional technique: separation, or symbolically and physically removing the offending “bad apples.” These efforts ultimately reframe the damaged image of the organization into one that is more positive and acceptable. In this sense, the communications and public relations literature is more about organizational impression management efforts than it is about the process of stigmatization that damaged the images of these organizations in the first place.

While limited, research and theorizing on stigmatized organizations has occurred at multiple levels of analysis, from the dyadic relationship to large organizations to the macro level of the nation/state. Such work is an important step in addressing Link and Phelan's (2001) concern regarding the inherently individualistic focus of stigma theory. In examining romantic relationships, Conley and Rabinowitz, for example, found that it is possible not only for the two individuals to be stigmatized for their behavior (i.e. using a condom instead of the pill) but also for the relationship itself to be stigmatized. They argue that, “The presence of a dyadic stigma suggests that ... relationships are perceived as separate entities from individuals” (2009:920) and that “stigma itself can be relationally based” (2009:939). The authors identify three types of stigmatized dyadic relationships: (1) those that are stigmatized as a result of the behavior of one member of the dyad; (2) those that are stigmatized for the joint behavior of the two members involved; and (3) a dyadic relationship that is stigmatized independent of the individuals involved.

These types add to Goffman’s (1963) primary type of stigmatization: an individual alone being stigmatized. The first type of stigmatized dyadic relationship identified by Conley and Rabinowitz extends the role played by contamination, understood by Goffman as a “courtesy stigma” (in which association with a stigmatized individual may taint the image of the otherwise nonstigmatized person), by positing that more than two individuals are then stigmatized: the relationship between them is stigmatized as well. However, it is possible to speculate about an additional type of relational stigma that applies to organizations larger than two persons. In this case, the organization as a whole is stigmatized by the behavior of two or more members of the organization, but not necessarily by the majority of members. This type also extends the role played by contamination and highlights the rationale for an organization to employ shifting the blame to a few “bad apples” and separating the offending members from the organization as a means of image restoration.


Dyads represent the smallest form of organizational unit that can be stigmatized. At the other end of the continuum, Rivera (2008) examined the macro-level stigma response of the country of Croatia as it worked to reestablish tourism after the wars of Yugoslav secession. Arguing that Goffman’s work on stigma may be effectively applied to the level of the state when one thinks of the state as a social actor, Rivera points out that there need to be modifications to original conceptual model. For example, in order to manage stigma, states may respond with (1) isolation, which is parallel to an individual severing ties with the nonstigmatized; (2) commemoration/apology, a variation on the individual’s response of disclosure of a stigmatized status; or (3) strategic self-presentation, what Goffman (1963) would term “passing” or “covering.” Strategic self-presentation “requires control of competing narratives” and can be achieved through “coercive control,” in which the state (or organization) “suppresses alternatives, or monopolizes opportunities for narrative performance” or through “indirect control, when there are no strong competing alternative narratives” (2008:617).

The specific stigma management response pursued by the state depends on the “properties of the situation” (Rivera 2008:616). If the state (or organization) is already discredited, commemoration or isolation are the possible responses. Covering through strategic self-presentation is possible in situations in which the state is discreditable—in which the stigmatizing behavior is unknown or easily overlooked and/or forgotten by members of the audience. Covering is also an ideal strategy when the stigma presents a strong barrier to desired rewards, such as income from tourism, when the stigmatizing incident is recent in the state’s history, and when the ability to control competing narratives is high (2008:617). Overall, Rivera’s research highlights the relevance of stigma theory to understanding macro-level cases such as that represented by Croatia, providing empirical evidence for how a state and by implication an organization can be stigmatized and successfully engage in stigma management techniques.

Building on recent recognition of organizational stigma (see Semadeni et al. 2008 and Wiesenfeld et al. 2008), perhaps the most theoretically driven examination of organizational stigma is offered by Devers et al., who define organizational stigma as “a label that evokes a collective stakeholder group-specific perception that an organization possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization” (2009:155). In other words, there is a strongly negative social evaluation of the organization that is then labeled and effectively categorizes the organization as one of a class of negatively evaluated organizations that are similarly discredited. Like Rivera (2008), Devers et al. draw distinctions between individual and organizational stigma, noting that they “differ primarily along three dimensions—the types of conditions that stigmatize, the prevention and removability of stigma, and the pervasiveness of stigmatizing categories” (2008:158).

While Goffman (1963) recognizes three stigmatizing conditions—abominations of the body, tribal stigmas, and defects in character or conduct stigma—these types of conditions are less meaningful when examining organizations. Devers et al. argue that conduct stigmas are the most common form for organizations, though some tribal stigmas are possible for organizations [i.e. they are based upon “the organization’s affiliation with a particular geographic market (e.g. the ‘Made in China’ label)” or because they provide a particular kind of product or service (2008:158)]. While the prevention or removal of a stigma is difficult for individuals, organizations have a great capacity for prevention or removal due to their structural complexity (e.g. multiple substructures, departments, and divisions). Such structural complexity makes it possible for the organization to credibly distance itself from the offending parts or members, what Brinson and Benoit (1999) identify as shifting the blame and separation—identifying the few “bad apples” and then removing them from the organization. Finally, Devers et al. (2008) argue that the stigmas faced by organizations are context specific whereas those faced by individuals tend to be pervasive across contexts in that the source of the stigma tends to be stigmatizing across many different interactive situations with multiple audiences. In contrast, much organizational behavior, such as downsizing, may be stigmatizing in the eyes of one audience (e.g. among labor representatives) and perceived as entirely acceptable by another audience (e.g. among stockholders).

Another important contribution made by Devers et al. has to do with the stigmatization process itself. When an organization is stigmatized, the labeling process must move from individual labeling to collective labeling (2008:160). The individual labeling process is guided by the perceived severity of the illegitimate practice(s) within the organization and perceived controllability and responsibility for the illegitimate practice(s) on the part of the organization. When the individual observer begins to “view the illegitimate behavior as not just some idiosyncratic event, but rather indicative of some stable, underlying features of the organization,” the individual begins to recognize that the values of the organization are incongruent with her or his own (2008:160). At this point, the individual stigmatizes the organization itself. The individual audience member will “label the value incongruent organization as a dangerous deviant and begin to symbolically transform the labeled organization through vilification into the antithesis of everything” she or he—and all those in her or his audience group—values (2008:162).


Collective labeling occurs when a “critical mass” of audience group members accept the label and claims made by the individual about the offending organization. The likelihood that a “critical mass” will be reached and the organization will be stigmatized is shaped by two factors: (1) whether the stigmatizing label applied to the organization resonates within a largely homogenous macroculture regarding the threatened beliefs, values and norms and (2) the status of the claims maker(s), i.e. the higher the status, the greater the likelihood that a critical mass will accept the stigmatizing label (Devers et al. 2008:163-164). As a result of the stigmatization of the organization, individual audience members will begin to disidentify with the organization in order to avoid the courtesy stigma identified by Goffman (1963). Ultimately, the stigmatized organization experiences a reduction in both the quantity and quality of interactions and exchanges with audience groups.

Overall, this line of research and theorizing into the stigmatized organization, while limited, opens the door for much more work in this area. Doing so will address the criticisms raised by Link and Phelan (2001) and Hannem (2012) that the conceptual model of stigmatization is generally micro-sociological in focus and largely ignores the relational/interactive and larger, structural dynamics involved in stigmatization.


Allport, Gordon W. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Benoit, William L. 1995. Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies, Edited by D. D. Cahn. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Brinson, Susan L. and William L. Benoit. 1999. "The Tarnished Star: Restoring Texaco's Damaged Public Image." Management Communication Quarterly 12(4):483-510.
Conley, Terri D. and Joshua L. Rabinowitz. 2009. "The Devaluation of Relationships (Not Individuals): The Case of Dyadic Relationship Stigmatization." Journal of Applied Social Psychology 39(4):918-44.
Devers, Cynthia E., Todd Dewett, Yuri Mishina and Carrie A. Belsito. 2009. "A General Theory of Organizational Stigma." Organization Science 20(1):154-71.
Goffman, Erving. 1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Hannem, Stacey and Chris Bruckert. 2012. Stigma Revisited: Implications of the Mark. Ottawa, ON: University of Ottawa Press.
Hearit, Keith Michael. 2001. "Corporate Apologia: When a Corporation Speaks in Defense of Itself." Pp. 501-11 in Handbook of Public Relations, edited by R. L. Heath. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Link, Bruce G. and Jo C. Phelan. 2001. "Conceptualizing Stigma." Annual Review of Sociology 27(1):363.
Rivera, Lauren A. 2008. "Managing "Spoiled" National Identity: War, Tourism, and Memory in Croatia." American Sociological Review 73(4):613-34.
Semadeni, Matthew, Albert A. Cannella, Jr., Donald R. Fraser and Scott Lee. 2008. "Fight or Flight: Managing Stigma in Executive Careers." Strategic Management Journal 29(5).
Wiesenfeld, B. M., K. Wurthmann and D. C. Hambrik. 2008. "The Stigmatization and Devaluation of Elites Associated with Corporate Failures: A Process Model." Academic Management Review 33(1):231-51.

Friday, December 6, 2013

Placing Stigma in Context

My current research involves an examination of the clergy sex abuse scandal and cover-up within the Catholic Church. As a social psychologist, and unlike an organizational sociologist, I am curious to explore the processes by which an organization is stigmatized. Individual priests, bishops, cardinals, and even the previous pope have been stigmatized for the part they played in this scandal, but the larger institution of the Church has been stigmatized as well. In reviewing the current literature on stigmatization, I find myself mystified by the fact that it is invariably studied without any sense of understanding the larger, conceptual context in which it is embedded. The following represents my early articulation of the relevance of Erving Goffman's other works to our understanding of stigma and is inspired by Ann Branaman's essay "Goffman's Social Theory."

* * * * *

An examination of the literature on stigma highlights the tendency of social researchers to consider stigmatization as a phenomenon set apart from Erving Goffman's other work on self and everyday social interaction. It's as if Goffman's work on stigma is somehow unrelated to impression management, total institutions, framing, strategic interaction, and interaction rituals when nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, while the works of Goffman are "seldom ... studied as a whole" (Branaman 1997:xiv), together they form an integrated system such that the other works of Goffman should inform our understanding of his conceptualization of stigma.

The nature of self informs us that stigmatized identity arises in the course of performance just as much as a "normal" identity does. The self arises through performances for which validation may be granted or withheld by the audience (Branaman 1997; Goffman 1959). To be perceived as moral, for example, one must act the part. At the same time, however, those around us must accept that performance in order to be truly considered moral. In order to sustain a positive image or self—in order for one's performance to be validated—one not only needs to perform well, but must also have access to "structural resources" and posses "desirable traits and attributes." Stigma primarily has to do with the latter: those who posses undesirable traits and attributes—and also those who simply do not have the desired traits—are stigmatized as a result. These individuals are put in a position in which they are expected to accept their lower, stigmatized status. Only that kind of performance is validated. A professional stripper is likely to have a difficult time presenting her or his self as moral, at least within the general public. Performances as a "normal"—or in this case, "moral"—person are not validated. Moreover, acceptance of one's status within the social hierarchy is a fundamental manifestation of the interaction rituals (Goffman 1967) that establish the social order that holds society together. In other words, the self one successfully performs is not something that is freely chosen; instead, it is accorded to her or him by society through the validation process.

At the same time, however, the individual—even the stigmatized individual—is motivated to present her or his self in the best possible light and to create the most advantageous image possible. The "self-as-performer," in seeking to present a positive image, also takes "precautions against embarrassment" (Branaman 1997:xlviii-xlix). For this reason, performance involves, among other techniques, both idealization and misrepresentation. Idealization implies not only presenting one's self as "living up to ideal standards," but also "entails a certain amount of concealment of inconsistencies" (1997:lii). This is where misrepresentation enters into the performance. For those whose stigma is readily apparent to others, what Goffman (1963) terms the "discredited" (such as most members of racial minority groups) it is very difficult to pass as a "normal" (or, in the case of the U.S., a white person). However, for the discreditable—those whose stigma is not obvious and is unknown to others—misrepresentation and idealization offer a chance to pass as a non-stigmatized person. The challenge for these individuals is in managing information about themselves—information that is discrediting and therefor stigmatizing. The professional stripper, for example, many pass her or his self off as a dancer.

In this way, the discreditable become involved in strategic interaction (Goffman 1969) with those around them. Misrepresentation and idealization necessarily involve keeping secrets about one's self. If the discrediting information comes to light—if an acquaintance catches the dancer performing in a strip club—validation of one's performance as "normal" and the attendant deference shown will be withheld. One will no longer be able to pass as a normal and will be stigmatized as a result. Such management of information is central to Goffman's conceptualization of expression games (Goffman 1969).

As already noted, to sustain a positive self through one's performances, one must not only possess traits deemed desirable but also have access to structural resources. Thus, structural resources, or the lack thereof, are arguably relevant to our understanding of stigmatization. Such resources are typically examined within the context of Goffman's work Asylums (1961). Within a total institution such as an asylum, the individual loses access to the structural resources to sustain a positive self image and thus the self changes dramatically as a result. Goffman (1971) discusses such resources in the context of "territories of self" (such as control over one's personal space and possessional territory). However, in more general terms, structural resources imply a certain amount of status and power. As described by Branaman, structural resources are determined by one's position within society: "[O]ne's place in various stratification orders determines where, when, and to what degree one can claim the territorial preserves necessary for sustaining self" (1997:lvi). In other words, those with higher social rank have more resources at their disposal—resources that may be employed to manage and hide discrediting information. A wealthy person may be given the benefit of the doubt and simply perceived as "eccentric" while a person from the low end of the stratification system may be perceived as needing professional help. In the event that discrediting information comes to light, such resources may be employed to help challenge or minimize the resulting stigma. In this way, structural resources may be employed to frame (Goffman 1974) the situation in the best possible light. Those with power are better able to frame events in a way that is supportive of their own interests—such as with the use of the term "eccentric"—or "combat [negative] interpretive frameworks applied to them" (Branaman 1997:lxxvi). Thus, the stigmatization that arises when discreditable information is revealed may be averted and more easily overcome.


Finally, and of most relevance in the case of the stigmatized organization, individuals will often coordinate their performances with others in a sort of team effort. If an entire team—such a the Catholic Church—is discreditable due to the behavior of one or more group members (I.e. individual priests and bishops), the team will then cooperate in order to pass. In other words, a successful performance includes defensive practices, such as "protecting secrets of [the] team" (Branaman 1997:lxvi). At the same time, in order to maintain the ritual order, the members of the audience also cooperate, engaging in practices such as, "voluntarily avoid[ing] the secret areas of the performers," avoiding the introduction of "contradictions to the performance, and pretend[ing] to 'not see' flaws" (1997:lxvi). This is particularly true in the case of those with status equal to or higher than those in the audience. In this way, the audience, in order to avoid embarrassment themselves, unwittingly cooperates with the performer(s), allowing them to pass as "normal" and maintain their discreditable status. For many years, scandal was averted by the Church, though rumors of sexual misconduct were common. Many were willing to give the Church the benefit of the doubt. In a sense, then, the audience becomes a part of the team and is willing to be fooled in order to preserve the ritual order of society.

Based on this discussion, it should be apparent that examining stigma as a social phenomenon that stands apart from other aspects of the interactive process does a disservice to Goffman's body of work. Stigmatization is deeply embedded in the presentation of one's self to others. It plays an important role in the ritual order of society and, in the case of those who are discreditable, it involves strategic interaction and expression games. Stigmatization is also dependent on the resources one has to maintain secrets and, in the event that discreditable information comes to light, allow the stigmatized to reframe it, effectively challenging or minimizing the damage to her or his image. By embedding Goffman's conceptualization of stigmatization within his entire body of work, one is able to recognize crucial elements of the process that otherwise go unnoticed. Without this larger, conceptual context, one's understanding of stigmatization is unnecessarily limited.


Branaman, Ann. 1997. "Goffman's Social Theory." Pp. xlv-lxxxii in The Goffman Reader, edited by Charles Lemert and Ann Branaman. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Goffman, Erving. 1959.
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor Books.

————. 1961.
Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. New York: Anchor Books.

————. 1963.
Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster.

————. 1967.
Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior. New York: Pantheon.

————. 1969.
Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

————. 1971.
Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order. New York: Basic Books.

————. 1974.
Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. New York: Harper and Row.

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Beyond a Doubt

In the beginning of the movie Doubt, the priest gives a sermon on that topic, saying that people can unite in doubt as much as they unite in certainty.  The main character, a nun who is the principal of the Catholic school, has great doubts about the moral standing of that priest and the appropriateness of his relationship with a particular boy in the school.  In fact, she has certainty in her doubt.  The young nun in the convent gets swept into these same doubts, though she's far less certain.  Extrapolating from small clues, and yet without any proof, the principal builds a case against him and ultimately forces him to resign his position. However, the bishop simply moves him to another parish … ironically, a parish and school with higher standing.

The audience is drawn into this tension between certainty and doubt.  Did he or didn't he?  Just as the audience becomes more doubtful about the priest and more certain of both his guilt and that the principal is justified in her actions, the boy's mother casts doubt yet again.  Is what the principal doing about the priest really the right thing if it harms the child as well?  For many, if not most in the audience, this perspective comes as a shock.  It is not a question they ... I ... have thought about before, especially given the priest sex abuse scandal that has shaken the Catholic Church to the core.

The audience is rocked again at the end of the movie when the principal breaks down crying, saying "I have doubts."  Does this mean that she really did wonder whether or not the priest was abusing the child despite her outward certainty?  Or is she bemoaning the fact that, by doubting the character of even those whom she was taught to respect, she is left with nothing but a very dark view of the world?

This powerful movie, the moral questions it raises, and the doubts it instills lingered in my mind long after I watched it for the first and even second time.  As a social psychologist, I can't help but be struck by the interactional dynamics at play and this has inspired my current research endeavor: to examine the Catholic sex abuse scandal through the lens of Erving Goffman's work on stigma. He examines how individuals manage their identities when spoiled as a result of, among other things, “defects in character” or deviant behavior. Given the power of labels, the mere accusation of guilt is enough to condemn the accused, permanently damaging her or his image. But what happens when an entire organization like the Catholic Church is stigmatized. How do the dynamics change?

Today, we know that many Catholic priests have sexually abused adolescents and children. This is well documented; but even without evidence and documentation, hearsay can destroy a reputation.  It doesn't require actual guilt.  In other words, when it comes to the social identity of the priest—his image in the eyes of others—his guilt or innocence is immaterial.  Even if, in a court of law, a person is acquitted of a crime, people are left with uncertainty regarding innocence or guilt:  "Are they really innocent, or did they simply get away with it because the case wasn't proven beyond a doubt?"  We the observers are united in our doubts regarding this person's moral standing and, like the principal in the movie, we can be certain in this belief.

The movie
Doubt (2008) and the Pulitzer and Tony-winning play upon which it is based (2004) are works of fiction, but they burst into popular culture at a time when the Catholic Church has has come under fire by the priest sex abuse scandal and its cover-up by bishops and other Church leaders. Many date this scandal to 2002 when records (including depositions and personnel files) in the case of Father Geoghan were released after The Boston Globe successfully challenged a judge's confidentiality order. However, sexual abuse by priests goes back decades—possibly centuries—being reported in the media as far back as 1985. If such abuse dates so far back in time, how is it that this scandal has emerged to such prominence only in the past decade? The answer lies it the power of the Church to keep secrets: an organization has many more resources at its disposal than an individual to maintain its image. At the same time, however, this power of secrecy was trumped by the power of doubt, doubts spread through rumors from a few people "in the know." Let's trace how this can happen.

The vast majority of cases of sexual abuse—like rape—go unreported. Within the context of the Catholic Church, it was particularly difficult to come forward given that Catholics, particularly prior to the 1960s, were so well socialized into a culture that highlights the moral authority of the Church as well as the high respect due to priests and the Church hierarchy. In those few instances when a case actually went to court, all those involved had to abide by confidentiality agreements and the records were sealed. Such damage control was used to protect the reputation of the institutional Church and even the reputation of the offending priest, who was typically moved to another parish where the abuse continued.

So, there were secrets at many levels. Individual priests kept secrets. Many of the victims kept it a secret. Sometimes the secret was between the victim, his or her family, the priest, and the bishop. Sometimes others were involved. Ultimately, the Church had to "enlist" the support of many individuals to protect its public reputation: therapists, support staff, lawyers, judges, jurors, and so on. There were many "small" secrets which together created a "big secret" for the Church. Because of the nature of secrets, however, there was no broad sense among the victims, their loved ones, and outside observers that these cases of abuse fell into a much larger social pattern that extended internationally.

However, with many secrets came whisperings and rumors. Seeds of "doubt" were sown. The sheer number of people who knew something made secrecy very difficult, highlighting the complexity of maintaining
organizational secrecy. Word began to spread, though largely in hushed tones, and the spread of these rumors brought to light more cases, making it increasingly difficult to keep The Big Secret as victims began to find safety in numbers. The tipping point came with the release of the Geoghan files. That case unleashed a flood of victims and media coverage exploded onto the national and then international stage. There was a rapid escalation in the scandal as these two processes—victims talking and later publicly coming forward and the corresponding rise in news coverage—supported and reinforced one another.

The image of the Catholic Church has been stigmatized as a result of its response (or lack of response beyond Herculean efforts to hide The Big Secret) to the sex abuse that occurred within its ranks. The moral authority of the institution has been cast into doubt. Again, as observed by the "offending" priest in the opening scene of the movie by that name, people can easily be united in doubt. Personally, I am no longer a practicing Catholic.  I have had my own doubts about the institutional Church since my years in college and these doubts have been reinforced as the sex abuse scandal has unfolded.  Was I shocked?  Not that sex abuse occurred and not that it was hidden away as much as possible.  What shocked me was the extent of the problem. 

The reputation of the Church has suffered a tremendous blow and the response of the Church to the scandal has only made it worse. Given the immensity of the institution, it is unavoidably clumsy in managing the stigma it now faces.  Even individuals face a daunting task in managing a stigma, but individuals are far more adept at responding "in the moment" than is an organization.  This scandal has been brewing for decades. Doubts go back just as far.  Healing is likely to extend as far, if not further, into the future.  Like the principal in the movie Doubt, entire generations of Catholics and non-Catholics alike will have doubts about the Church and it's moral authority for years to come.